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Harmonization Of Company Law In The
European Economic Community
By HuGH J. AULT*
Introduction
THE creation of the European Economic Community by the Treaty
of Rome' has resulted in far-reaching changes in the economic life
of the six Member States.2 These changes have in turn required
modifications in the legal framework within which commercial ac-
tivities take place. This is particularly true as to the rules in the
Member States regarding company organization, operation and valid-
ity, which have developed in differing legal frameworks and in-
volve numerous areas of divergent substantive provisions.
The necessity of adapting the existing legal order to the new
economic patterns was clearly foreseen by the drafters of the Treaty
of Rome. In some fields the Rome Treaty contemplates a wholly
new Community law. Article 87, for example, gives law-making com-
petence to the Community institutions to deal with anti-trust mat-
ters. In other fields, however, the necessary legal adjustments are to
be achieved by changes in the national laws of the Member States.
Article 3(h) of the Treaty includes in the activities of the Com-
munity "the approximation of... national laws to the extent required
for the Common Market to function in an orderly manner. .... "3
The method by which this approximation 4 is to take place is de-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1 Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958). There is no
official English translation of the Treaty of Rome. A translation was made in
Great Britain by Her Majesty's Stationery Office and was first published in
1962. 1 CCH Comnm. MKT. REP. 151 (1962). This is the most readily avail-
able source in the United States and all Treaty references are to it unless
otherwise noted. All other translations of foreign material are by the author
unless otherwise noted.
2 Belgium, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands.
3 1 CCH Com¢nm. MKT. Rm'. 1 171 (1962).
4 Article 3 (h) and Article 100 speak of the "approximation" (rapproch-
ement, Angleichung) of municipal legislation. Article 99 deals with "harmoni-
zation" of various aspects of national law. Some commentators have seen
these differing expressions in the Treaty as representing different grants of
power to the Council. The Council is said to have a greater competence in
veloped in more detail in several subsequent sections of the Treaty.
The basic authorization for achieving this harmonization is Article
100, which provides that the Community Council of Ministers may
issue directives (directive, Richtlinie) to the Member States for
the approximation of any legislative or administrative provisions
which "directly affect the establishment or operation of the Common
Market."5
In addition to the general provisions for harmonization found in
Article 100, the Treaty authorizes the Council to undertake a coordi-
nation of national laws in certain designated fields. Coordination of
company law provisions is dealt with specifically in Article 54(3)
(g). This Article empowers the Council to issue directives dealing
with "the coordination, to the extent necessary, of the protective pro-
visions (garanties, Schutzbestimmungen) laid down by the Member
States, in the interests of shareholders and third parties and applied
to companies as defined in Article 58(2), in order to make such pro-
visions equivalent ... "0
The projected coordination of company law involves significant
problems. The differences in the existing national laws concerning
shareholders and third parties dealing with companies are often the
result of a more deep-seated divergence on questions of policy. In
many situations, protection of one group is only possible at the ex-
pense of the other, and where the national lawmakers have resolved
these questions differently, progress in coordination is necessarily
difficult.
After much delay, the Council, acting on a proposal by the EEC
Commission, the executive body of the Community, has recently
taken a significant step toward the coordination of company law pro-
visions contemplated in Article 54(3) (g) by issuing the first Direc-
areas where it is to effect an "approximation" than it has in those fields in
which only "coordination" or "harmonization" is foreseen. See Gessler, Ziele
und Methoden der Harmonisierung des Gesellschaftsrechtes der GmbH, in
HARmONISIERUNG DES GEsELLscHAFTsREcnTFs UND DES STEURRECHTS DER GivwH
in EuRoPA 9, 11 (1962); Monaco, Comparaison et rapprochement des ligislations
dans le march6 commun eurep6en, 12 REVUE INTERATIONALE DE DRoiT ComARE
[REv. INT. DR. COxM.]61 (1960); Renauld, Aspects de la coordination et du
-rapprochement des dispositions relatives aux socists, [1967] CAu .ss D. DROIT
EuRoPEEN 611. This approach seems over-refined. Linguistic differences in
the four official versions of the Treaty make this kind of subtle differentiation
at best a questionable undertaking. Hence in this article the terms "approxi-
mation," "coordination," and "harmonization" will all be used interchangeably
to mean a reduction in the differences in the existing national laws.
5 1 CCH Comn. MKT. REP. 3301 (1962).
6 Author's translation based on the French and German texts. For the
original texts, see 1 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 1331 (1962).
[Vol. 20THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
live in this field.7 The Directive deals with three areas of company
law: disclosure of information, validity of company obligations, and
the causes and effects of improper formation. It requires the Member
States to make certain adjustments in their national laws in response
to the Directive. The new Directive is important both in terms of the
substantive company law matters it treats and for the insight it gives
into the problems of adapting the national legal systems of the Mem-
ber States to the increasingly international character of business
activities within the Community.
It is the purpose of this article to examine some of the provi-
sions of the new Directive and the changes which the Directive will
require in the national company laws. In order to understand the
context in which the Directive was issued, the procedures for coordi-
nation set up in Article 54 (3) (g) will first be analyzed. After a con-
sideration of the Directive and its effects on the national legal sys-
tems, the relationship between Article 54(3) (g) and the various pro-
posals for the creation of a form of "European company" will be
explored.
I. Article 54(3)(g): Harmonization of Company Law under
the Lead of Community Institutions
A. Procedure Under Article 54(3) (g): Action by Directive
It was hoped at first that differences among the company laws
of the Member States would gradually disappear as the Community
developed. The needs of the new market would generate a "spon-
taneous coordination" of company law, and resort to the procedures
of Article 54(3) (g) would prove unnecessary. Although there has
been much activity in the Member States concerning the reform of
company law,9 surprisingly little effort seems to have been made to
7 First Council Directive of March 9, 1968, on the Coordination of the
Protective Provisions laid down by the Member States in the Interests of
Shareholders and Third Parties and applied to Companies as defined in Article
58(2), in order to make such Provisions Equivalent, [1968] E.E.C. J.O. No.
L 65/8 [hereinafter cited as First Company Law Directive]. See 1 CCH
Comn. MxT. REP. 1355-69 (1968) for an unofficial English translation of
the First Company Law Directive.
s M. LuTTER, KAPITAL, SICHERUNG DER KAPITALAUFBRINGUNG mw KAPITAL-
ERHALTUNG IN N AxTIF-uNw-GMBH RECHTEN DER EWG 26 (1964); Dumon,
La Formation de la Ragle de Droit dans les Communaut6s europ~ennes, 12 REv.
INT. DR. CoA,. 75, 80 (1960).
9 Germany and France have both made substantial changes in their
company laws recently, and company law reforms are being discussed in Bel-
gium, Italy and the Netherlands. For a survey of the developments see Re-
view of Recent Literature on Corporation Law, 4 Comv. MKT. L. Ruv. 113-17,
476-79 (1966-67).
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coordinate these projects. An early suggestion by a noted commenta-
tor that reform of company law by one country independent of the
other Member States was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of
the Treaty of Rome10 has not been heeded, and national reform has
proceeded unabated. To some extent, the independent national re-
forms have resulted in a narrowing of previously existing differences
in company law. In particular, the new French company law seems
to have been influenced by proposals in the draft directive on com-
pany law first put forward by the Commission in 1964.11 Nonetheless,
there is still considerable need for further harmonization of certain
company law provisions, and it is here that Article 54 (3) (g) becomes
important.
Articles 54 (2) and 54 (3) (g) provide that the Council shall act by
means of directives to coordinate company law provisions. Under the
directive procedure set up in Article 189, the Council determines the
"result to be achieved" in the directive while the "form and manner"
of implementing the directive is left up to the Member States. 2
Thus, the new Company Law Directive is addressed to the Member
States and requires them to conform their legislation and administra-
tive regulations to the "results" set out in the Directive. The direc-
tive procedure is particularly appropriate for the kind of action fore-
seen under Article 54(3) (g) since it permits, within certain limits, a
coordination of existing company legislation without an extensive
derogation of national sovereignty.
There is one point concerning the Council's power to issue direc-
tives under Article 54(3) (g) which deserves special attention. Under
the terms of the Article, the directives have as their purpose to make
"equivalent" (6quivalent, gleichwertig) certain company law provi-
sions. The Article does not require that the existing laws be made
identical and indeed, this is implicit in the whole process of action
by directive.
This aspect of the Article has led some commentators to assert
that the Article does not foresee the development of a uniform com-
10 Bfirmann, Ist eine Aktienrechtsreform fiberhaupt noch zuldssig?, [1959]
JUPISTENZEIUNG 434.
11 See text accompanying notes 37-44 infra. For the legislative history of
the French reforms, see [1965] JOUNA. OrFrCL r. DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
(J.O.) 1676 (National Assembly Debate of June 1, 1965); [1963-64] J.O. 693,
697 (Law Project No. 1003. See generally G. RiPERT, TnAiTE ELEMENTAIRE DE
DROIT COMMERCIAL 534-35 (6th ed. 1968).
12 For a general discussion of the directive process, see J. LANG, THE COm-
MON MARKET AND COiMnMON LAw 10 (1966); J. OLDF.op, DIE acHTUNIE DER
EWG (34 Studien zum internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht und Atomenergierecht,
1968).
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pany law within the Community. 3 In one sense, this position is un-
deniably correct. As regards the scope of Article 54 (3) (g), i.e., those
areas of company law which are to be treated, the Article is certainly
limited.14 On a fair reading, it does not anticipate that all company
legislation will be affected. However, a distinction must be made be-
tween the scope of the Article and the power of the Council to
regulate areas within that scope.
In many areas of company law, the differences among the existing
statutes can be adjusted without resort to a uniform rule. Where
the differences are only matters of degree, e.g., the number of in-
corporators or the minimum amount of capital required, a direc-
tive need only lay down certain basic requirements and leave the
Member States free to act within this framework. Other company
rules, however, involve a choice between mutually exclusive alterna-
tives. A company is or is not bound by ultra vires acts of its offi-
cers; a finding that the company was improperly formed either does
or does not have retroactive effect. In matters like these, the Council
must adopt one rule or the other and require that it be enacted
throughout the Community. Only in this way can "equivalence"
be achieved.
Several of the provisions in the new Directive set out require-
ments which offer the Member States little flexibility in their re-
sponse. This aspect of the new Directive undoubtedly will be criti-
cized by those who see its specific demands as an unauthorized inva-
sion of national sovereignty, but such specificity in this situation ap-
pears necessary to carry out the objectives of the Treaty. The only
alternative would be to say that in those areas of company law in
which a definite rule is required, the Council is without power
to harmonize the existing law. This unhappy result would clearly
undermine the usefulness of the Article which authorizes action by
the Council "to the extent necessary." The Council thus would
seem justified in using the directive procedure to require the adop-
tion of uniform rules in certain instances in the company law area.15
13 Gessler, supra note 4, at 12-14; Renauld, supra note 4, at 622. See also
U. EVERLING, THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THE COMMON MAR=ET 78 (1964).
14 See text accompanying notes 30-37 infra.
15 The use of directives to require the adoption by the Member States of
uniform rules is well established in other fields and often the directives go
into astonishing detail. See, e.g., Directive of June 26, 1964, [1964] E.E.C. J.O.
1977 (dealing with the size, shape and location of the stamp which must be
placed on inspected meats); Directive of October 23, 1962, [1962] E.E.C. J.O.
2645 (detailed regulations concerning coloring and conservatives in food-
stuffs); J. OrnEKoP, supra note 12, at 87-95.
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B. Article 54(3) (g) and Freedom of Establishment
Article 54(3) (g) is placed in that section of the Rome Treaty
which deals with the right of establishment, and in order to under-
stand its function, it is useful first to examine some of the Treaty
Articles concerned with establishment. Article 52 provides:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on
the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the
territory of another Member State shall be abolished by progressive
stages in the course of the transitional period. Such progressive aboli-
tion shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State estab-
lished in the territory of any Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to engage in and
carry on non-wage-earning activities, to set up and manage undertak-
ings and, in particular, firms and companies (socigtis) within the
meaning of Article 58 (2), under the conditions laid down for its own
nationals by the laws of the country where such establishment is
effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.
The Commission has interpreted the concept of freedom of estab-
lishment very broadly. For example, it has stated that freedom
of establishment includes the right to have access to credit and other
sources of financing within the country of establishment.0 Thus,
the list of activities set forth in Article 52 is not to be taken as ex-
haustive.
By its terms, Article 52 is limited in its applicability to "na-
tionals." Article 58, however, extends the right of establishment
to companies organized within the Member States.17 Acting under
16 Berkhouwer, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission du marchg int6-
rieur du Parlement europ~en, [1966-1967] Eun. PARL. Docs., No. 53 (1966)
(Answer No. 9) [hereinafter cited as Internal Market Comm'n Rep.]. The
Report was also published in 2 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [RE.
TR. Dn. Eun.] 434 (1966). This Report, prepared by the Internal Market Com-
mission of the European Parliament, deals with the first draft directive on
company law and contains questions to and answers from the E.E.C. Commis-
sion on many aspects of coordination under Article 54(3) (g) of the Treaty of
Rome.
17 Treaty of Rome, Article 52 requires the abolition of restrictions on
individual nationals of Member States. Article 58 then provides that com-
panies incorporated in one Member State and having their "registered office,
central administration or principal place of business within the Community"
shall be "treated in the same way as" natural persons who are nationals of
Member States. After some early dispute (See Audinet, The Right of Estab-
lishment in the European Economic Community, [1959] JouRNAL Du Dnorr IN-
TERNATIONAL 983; 2 E. STEmi & T. NICHOLSON, AMERIcAN ENTERPRISE IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE 67 (1960)), it seems clear that
the conditions of Article 58 are to be read disjunctively. To prevent companies
with only a registered office in the Community from taking advantage of the
establishment provisions, the Council in the General Program for the Removal
of Restrictions on the Right of Establishment required, in interpreting Article
52, that a company must have a "continuous and effective link with the econ-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
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Article 54, the Council passed the General Program for the Re-
moval of Restrictions on the Right of Establishment, 8 setting up a
timetable for the abolition of these restrictions. The Council has
implemented the General Program with a series of directives in vari-
ous fields requiring the elimination of restrictions on establishment
based on nationality.' 9
The early directives did not deal specifically with restrictions
on the exercise of establishment rights by companies. In the direc-
tive on wholesale trades published in 1964, however, the Council
ordered the elimination of certain existing statutory provisions which
had been used to control the access of foreign corporations to local
markets.20 The directive stated that "no additional conditions and
especially no special permission" could be required from foreign com-
panies which were not also demanded from domestic companies. 2 '
The elimination of establishment restrictions based on nationality
has increased the means available by which Community-based enter-
prises may extend their activities into other Member States. In the
past, subsidiaries organized under the laws of the receiving state were
the vehicles most commonly used to carry on business in another
omy of a Member State" before it can be a beneficiary of the abolition of re-
strictions on setting up branches, agencies and subsidiaries. Note 18 infra; see
Lang, The Right of Establishment of Companies and Free Movement of Capital
in the European Economic Community, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMiENT
AND ORGAizAnoN 288 (1967).
18 [1962] E.E.C. 3.O. 32.
19 See, e.g., [1964] E.E.C. J.O. 1880 (Directive requiring abolition of all
restrictions mentioned in the General Program in a broad range of industries);
[1964] E.E.C. 3.O. 869 (Directive requiring abolition of restrictions based on
nationality for middlemen and distributors from other Member States); [1963]
E.E.C. J.O. 1326 (Directive requiring abolition of restrictions on farming and
holding land by nationals of other Member States).
20 [1964] E.E.C. J.O. 863. Germany, for example, required that "foreign
juridical persons" obtain special permission to do business within the Federal
Republic. GEwERBEARDNuNG § 12 (1949). It also repeated the requirement
for corporations. AKTINGESETZ § 292 (1949). Both these provisions were
modified in accordance with the directive. Law of August 13, 1965, [1965]
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB.] I, at 849. It is interesting to note that the German
Bundestag followed exactly the Treaty and the General Program in defining
those companies against whom the restrictions would no longer be applied.
The restrictions were eliminated for "foreign juridical persons which are
formed under the laws of a Member State of the European Economic Com-
munity and have their registered office, central administration or principal
place of business within the Community." In line with the General Program,
if a foreign juridical person had its registered office but neither its cen-
tral administration nor principal place of business within the Community, it
would have to demonstrate an "effective and continuous connection with the
economy of a Member State" to be accorded free establishment rights.
21 [1964] E.E.C. J.O. 864.
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state. The subsidiary form will still be available without limitation,
but in addition, with the abolition of restrictions on establishment,
operations in the form of branches or agencies in another Member
State will also be possible.22 Smaller companies, for whom the ex-
pense and inconvenience of setting up a subsidiary in a foreign coun-
try was especially burdensome, are being attracted by the new pos-
sibility of making unrestricted use of the right to set up foreign
branches. There are, of course, numerous factors involved in choos-
ing between a branch or subsidiary form of foreign operation, and tax
considerations are often of paramount importance. Nonetheless, it
seems clear that the elimination of establishment restrictions will re-
sult in an increase in the number of branches and agencies involved
in business between Member States.
23
This increased use of branches, however, carries with it some
legal problems with which Article 54(3) (g) is directly concerned.
Under the principles of conflict of laws or "private international
law" followed in most of the Member States, the applicable company
law, i.e., the company's "personal" law, is determined generally by
reference to the law of the state in which the company has its center
of control or si~ge social (Geschiftssitz).24 This is usually also the
state in which it is incorporated.25 As branches become more sig-
22 See M. LuTTER, supra note 8, at 11 for an analysis of the business
practices.
23 See Lutter, Die Angleichung des Gesellschaftsrechtes nach dem
EWG - Vertrag, 19 NEUE JumisTiscHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 273, 277 (1966).
24 See, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 5, 1937, 153 Entscheidungen des Reichs-
gerichts in Zivilsachen (RGZ) 200 (the German court applied Dutch law to
determine the effect of a bankruptcy proceeding on the powers of the repre-
sentatives of a corporation with its siage social in Holland); Judgment of Dec.
16, 1913, 83 RGZ 367, (the German court looked to Wisconsin law for the legal
status of a corporation having its siege social there). For the laws of the
other Member States, see 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A CowmPAIrVE
STUDY 33-38 (2d ed. 1960).
The determination of where a company actually has its siage social can
often be difficult and the tests vary. See id. at 40-46; G. SCHLOSSER, DIE
GESELLSCIAFTLICHEN NIEDERLASSUNGEN INNERHALB DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRT-
SCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT ALS PROBLEM DES INTERNEN AND DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHTS 50-59 (1965).
25 While it may be possible at least in theory for a company to be incor-
porated in one Member State and have its si~ge social in another, this situa-
tion has been quite uncommon as a practical matter, since a separation of
siage social and state of incorporation usually resulted in the company's fail-
ure to be recognized as a legal entity in the other states. See Beitzke, Anerkcen-
nung und Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften und juristischen Personen im
EWG- Bereich, 127 ZEITSCHRT FUR DAS GESAMTE H-ANDELSRECHT UND WIRT-
SCHAFTSRECHT (Z.H.R.) 1, 13 (1964). This result will be modified on the rati-
fication of the recently signed Convention Relating to the Mutual Recognition
of Companies and Legal Persons. 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. f 6083-6103
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nificant in business between Community companies, this choice-of-
law rule takes on added importance.
For example, suppose a corporation organized in Belgium doing
business in a field covered by a directive eliminating restrictions on
establishment desires to enter the German market and does so by
means of a branch office. The German branch of the Belgian com-
pany would enter into contracts and other legal relations with its
German customers. However, should a dispute between the parties
arise and litigation result, as a matter of conflict of laws, the German
courts under the traditional doctrine would apply Belgian law in
many matters. Certain protections offered the German third party
under German law (e.g., the rule limiting the effect of restrictions
on the power of a company representative) ,26 might be unavailable.
The additional risks in dealing with a foreign corporation under these
circumstances might discourage intra-Community business activities
and hamper the full utilization of establishment rights.
Article 54(3) (g) foresees a coordination of company law "pro-
tective provisions" so that the risks inherent in dealing with an en-
tity subject to the rules of another legal system can be minimized.
However, it would seem that a much simpler solution to this particular
problem is possible. The danger to legal security created by increased
branch operations arises from the fact that the branch's legal rela-
tions are determined in some part by the law of its si~ge social.
Article 52, however, grants to companies only the right to be ad-
mitted to the territories of other Member States "under the conditions
laid down for [the State's] own nationals by the law of the country
where such establishment is effected . . . ." Thus, there would be
nothing to prevent the state of establishment from applying its own
laws to the branch of a foreign corporation where such application
was necessary to protect the interests of nationals of that state deal-
ing with the foreign corporation.
2 7
This approach, however, while promoting legal security from the
viewpoint of third parties, overlooks the burdens which overlapping
(1968). See text accompanying notes 89-92 infra for a discussion of certain
aspects of the Convention.
26 See text accompanying notes 94-101 infra.
27 The Community Court of Justice, in interpreting Articles 52 and 53,
has held that a Member State was only prohibited by Article 52 from subject-
ing foreign nationals to stricter rules regarding establishment than those ap-
plied to its own nationals. Costa v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impressa
gih della Edison Volta, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Comm. MXT. RPT.
8023 (1964). Thus a non-discriminating rule would not infringe a foreign
national's establishment rights. See Rodire, L'harmonisation des l6gislations
europ~ennes dans le cadre de la C.E.E., 1 REv. TR. DR. EUR. 336, 347-48 (1965).
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regulatory systems can have on companies carrying on multi-state
operations. Companies exercising the right of establishment in sev-
eral countries could be subject to confusing and contradictory sets
of regulations imposed by the various Member States to insure pro-
tection of their own nationals dealing with foreign corporations. It
was to avoid this undesirable result that the drafters of the Rome
Treaty, by Article 54(3) (g), provided for the coordination of certain
aspects of company law to solve the problem of legal security without
imposing a multiplicity of possibly conflicting regulations on business
enterprises. This coordination was limited to "protective provisions"
since it is exactly provisions of that type which are important for
legal security and, at the same time, involve matters in which a
national court would be most likely to apply its own law to foreign
companies.
So far the focus of the discussion has been on the protection of
third parties dealing with a foreign corporation doing business in
branch form in another Member State. Article 54(3) (g), however,
also deals with the coordination of protective provisions for the bene-
fit of shareholders, and here the connection with freedom of estab-
lishment is somewhat different. The coordination of shareholder pro-
tections must be seen from the point of view of the company exer-
cising its establishment rights by forming a subsidiary under the laws
of another Member State. Since subsidiaries are generally used only
by the larger and more internationally experienced firms, differ-
ences in company law in this context do not result in the same threat
to legal security as that posed in connection with branch operations.
A company setting up a foreign subsidiary is more likely to be aware
of any important differences in company law than a third party
dealing in the ordinary course of business with the local branch of a
foreign company. On the other hand, when a company has several
subsidiaries located in different Member States, differences in com-
pany law could result in burdensome administrative problems, and
thus some coordination would be desirable from the shareholder point
of view.
In addition to such administrative problems, there are other rea-
sons for including shareholder protection within the ambit of Article
54(3) (g). First, because of the inseparable connection between the
interests of shareholders and the interests of third parties dealing
with the company, a coordination of the provisions relating to one
group could not be undertaken without consideration of the interests
of the other. Secondly, Article 220(3) provides for negotiations by
the Member States looking to a convention allowing companies to
transfer their seat of operations from one Member State to another
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURN AL [Vol. 20
without dissolution and loss of legal personality.2 When such a
transfer becomes possible, the shareholders of a company moving its
seat from one Member State to another will become subject to the
company law of the state of reception, and the protections offered
shareholders under that law may be considerably different from
those to which they were accustomed. The coordination of share-
holder protection would facilitate the transfer of corporate activities
once the other problems connected with a transfer of seat have been
solved by negotiation. It should be noted, however, that the exer-
cise of establishment rights in the form of a transfer of seat seems
somewhat distant in time, and the coordination of shareholder protec-
tion must be considered less crucial at this stage in the Community's
development than the harmonization of protective provisions for
the benefit of third parties.29
In a somewhat larger perspective, there is a final need for
coordination of company law provisions related to freedom of estab-
lishment. Companies, in exercising their establishment rights by set-
ting up branches or locally incorporated subsidiaries, should not be
influenced in their choice of location by differences in the national
company laws. Company law provisions would seem to be of rela-
tively little importance in the decision to move into a new market.
However, certain matters, such as disclosure requirements, rules
dealing with capitalization, and merger provisions can have some
effect on the manner in which establishment rights are exercised. In
such areas coordination under Article 54(3) (g) can help to ensure
that economic forces alone influence the pattern of business develop-
ment.
C. The Scope of Article 54(3)(g)
The somewhat enigmatic language of Article 54(3) (g) has led to
considerable controversy over the intended scope of its application.3"
The Commission takes the position that the Article has "a very wide
scope."31 On the other hand, it is apparent that the Article is not
intended to cover the whole field of company law, and various argu-
ments have been put forth in support of a restrictive interpretation.
The procedures under which the Article operates, 32 its "legislative
28 Under the laws of most of the Member States, it is impossible for a
company to transfer its seat to another country without a technical dissolu-
tion of the company which often has accompanying tax disadvantages. See
generally G. ScHLossER, supra note 24, at 115-37.
29 See Lutter, supra note 23, at 277.
30 See Renauld, supra note 4, at 611-13, for a representative sampling of
the literature.
31 Internal Market Comm'n Rep., supra note 16 (Answer No. 13).
32 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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history, '33 its relation to other Treaty articles, 34 and the existence of
diverse company statutes in the United States35 all have been cited
as reasons for limiting the coordination of company law under
Article 54(3) (g).
A definitive resolution of the question of the scope of the Article
in advance of a decision by the Community Court of Justice is im-
possible. A few points, however, can be made with some degree of
certainty. First, it should be noted that the competence of the Coun-
cil to issue directives under Article 54(3) (g) is limited to the reduc-
tion of differences in national company laws which hamper the ex-
tension of a company's activities by means of an establishment in
another Member State. Where changes in national company law
are felt desirable for reasons unrelated to establishment, e.g., to im-
plement anti-trust policy, Article 54(3) (g) alone cannot serve as the
33 Scholten, Company Law in Europe, 4 Commnz. MKT. L. REV. 377, 383-86
(1966-67), analyzes the working papers used during the drafting of the Arti-
cle and concludes that they point to a narrow interpretation. The author
concedes, however, that the Treaty "has its own life after it comes into being."
Id. at 386.
34 Under Article 54, directives may be issued by the Council on the basis
of a qualified majority of the Representatives after the end of the second
stage. On the other hand, under Article 100, the general article authorizing
harmonization of legislation in all fields, unanimity is required at all times.
This has led some to the conclusion that there could have been no thought
by the drafters of the Treaty that Article 54(3) (g) could have any extensive
application in the company law area or else the qualified majority approach
would not have been adopted. Thus any extensive coordination of company
law must be based on Article 100 and not on Article 54(3) (g) alone. Renauld,
supra note 4, at 623; Scholten, supra note 33, at 382. It could be argued in
reply that because of the very general and open-ended nature of Article 100
and its possible application to all fields of law and regulations, a unanimity
requirement was felt necessary. This does not, however, have any limiting
implications for an article like 54(3) (g) which is directed only to a single
field of law. The whole point may be rendered moot as a practical matter
in the light of French objections to relinquishing a veto in the Council. See
generally Lambert, The Constitutional Crisis 1965-66, 4 J. Comnvr. MEKT.
STUDIEs 195 (1965-66).
35 See, e.g., Arnold, Die Angleichung des Gesellschaftsrechtes in der
Europdischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft [1963] AussENWTSCHAFTSDIENST DES
BETms-BERATERs [hereinafter cited as AWD] 221, 222. There are several
reasons which make it somewhat misleading to base an argument for limited
coordination of company law in the Community on the multiplicity of state
corporate statutes in the United States. The common language and legal
tradition, the unifying effect of overarching Federal legislation, and the vari-
ous movements for uniformity culminating in the Model Business Corporation
Act, now adopted in substantially similar form in a number of states, all dis-
tinguish the American experience from the situation in the Community. See
also Leleux, Corporation Law in the United States and in the E.E.C., 5 Comm.
MKT. L. REV. 133 (1967-68), for a thorough comparative study.
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basis for a directive requiring such changes. Thus, it is clear that
directives issued on the basis of Article 54(3) (g) to promote coordi-
nation of company law must bear some relation to the problems cre-
ated by the freedom of establishment granted in Article 52.
Secondly, within the field of freedom of establishment, the pri-
mary concern of Article 54(3) (g) is to ensure legal seeurity in
intra-Community business transactions. Thus the Article, even
within the area of freedom of establishment, does not cover company
law in its entirety, but is limited to "protective provisions" for the
benefit of third parties and shareholders. This second qualifica-
tion may appear to be of minor significance since, in a sense, most
company law is related in some way or other to the protection of
shareholders or third parties. However, certain provisions, such as
requirements for disclosure or of minimum capitalization, are much
more clearly "protective" in nature than company regulations con-
cerning more general matters such as company structure or manage-
ment. By using the qualified term "protective provisions" rather than
referring simply to "company law," the drafters of the Treaty seem to
have focused on company law provisions which are "protective" in
the narrower sense.
The debate on the scope of Article 54(3) (g) until recently had
been somewhat general since no actual directives had been issued
by the Council. In the preamble of the First Company Law Directive
of March 9, 1968,36 however, the Council cited as the treaty authoriza-
tion for the Directive only Article 54(3) (g). Thus, the Directive
raises the problem of the scope of this Article for the first time in a
concrete manner. After this initial examination of Article 54(3) (g),
a more detailed consideration of the First Company Law Directive,
and its treatment of the problems discussed thus far relative to that
Article, is now appropriate.
U. The First Company Law Directive
A. Background
The new Company Law Directive has a long history. It was
first proposed in draft form by the Commission in February of 1964.3 7
In accordance with the procedures set out in Article 54, the draft
directive was then referred to the Economic and Social Committee, a
consultative body composed of representatives from various occupa-
tional and economic groups, which reported on the directive on No-
36 First Company Law Directive, supra note 7.
3 [1964] BuLL. E.E.C. (Supp. No. 3). For a discussion of the first draft
directive, see Fikentscher & Grossfeld, The Proposed Directive on Company
Law, 2 Comnvt. MKT. L. Rsv. 259 (1964-65).
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vember 28, 1964.38 The draft directive was then submitted to the
European Parliament which had it under consideration for nearly
two years. An extensive memorandum on the draft directive was
prepared by the Internal Market Commission under the leadership of
Mr. Berkhouwer 89 and the draft directive was discussed in the Par-
liamentary sessions of May 10 through May 12, 1966.40 Both the
Economic and Social Committee4 1 and the Parliament 42 suggested
numerous changes in the draft directive and in October of 1966, the
Commission submitted a revised draft directive to the Council, which
reflected those changes in some degree.43 The draft directive was
then considered by Permanent Representatives within the Council,
and the final form of the Directive was approved by the Council on
March 9, 1968.44
The Directive is primarily concerned with a coordination of cer-
tain company law provisions affecting third parties dealing with com-
panies. The Directive involves three substantive areas. First, it
sets forth various requirements for the disclosure of information by
companies covered by the Directive.45 Secondly, the Directive coordi-
nates some long-standing differences in the laws of the Member States
concerning the power of a company representative to bind his com-
38 [1964] E.E.C. J.0. 3245.
89 Internal Market Comm'n Rep., supra note 16.
40 [1966-1967] EuR. PARm. DEB., No. 85, at 83-106 (May 12, 1966); id. at
56-73 (May 11, 1966); id. at 41-46 (May 10, 1966). The final text of the Reso-
lution of Parliament approving the draft directive also was published in
[1966] E.E.C. J.0. 1519.
41 [1964] E.E.C. J.O. 3245.
42 [1966] E.E.C. J.0. 1519.
48 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 1 9141 (1966) (Report No. 46, Dec. 20, 1966).
44 Several other directives intended to implement Article 54(3) (g) are
currently under consideration by the Commission though they have not been
officially published. The second draft directive is said to deal with rules
concerning incorporation and capitalization for corporations and limited lia-
bility companies. The third draft directive treats the structure of corporate
organization. Skaupy, Europiisches Geselischaftsrecht, 11 DiE AxTNGESEL-
LSCLAFT 13, 17-18 (1966); Review of Recent Literature on Corporation Law,
4 Comm. MKT. L. REv. 113, 121 (1966-67). In addition, several questions are
expressly left open in the First Company Law Directive and will be handled
in later directives. See text accompanying notes 79-88 infra.
45 The Directive applies to corporations (socigtd anonyme [S_.],
Aktiengesellschaft [AG]), limited liability companies (socijtU & respons-
abilit6 limitge [S.A.R.L.], Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter Haftung [GmbH])
and certain limited partnerships. The S.A. and AG are similar in most re-
spects to the American corporate form. The S.A.R.L. and GmbH have no
direct analogue. They serve the same function as the American "close" cor-
poration. The organization of the limited liability company is much simpler
than that of the corporation, and their shares are generally not readily
transferable.
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pany. Thirdly, the Directive deals with the failure of companies to
incorporate properly, especially insofar as improper incorporation
has an effect on third parties. In general, the Member States are
given eighteen months after notification of the Directive to change
their domestic laws and regulations to meet the requirements of the
Directive.
The following discussion will relate the preceding analysis of the
scope and function of Article 54(3) (g) to some of the company law
matters dealt with in the Directive. The changes which the Direc-
tive requires in selected existing national legal systems will be con-
sidered, as well as the question of whether such changes can be de-
manded solely on the basis of Article 54(3) (g). It would be redundant
to investigate the laws of all six of the Member States on each point.
Hence certain national laws which present the most interesting con-
trasts have been selected for closer examination.46
B. Disclosure of Tnformation
When a national of one country is dealing with a company or-
ganized in another country, it is of utmost importance that he be able
to find out information about that company quickly and in terms
he can understand. This is true, for example, if he is entering into a
contract for the sale of goods or is considering a loan to the company.
As trade between Member States in the Community accelerates, ade-
quate disclosure of the legal and financial status of companies be-
comes increasingly important. The present pattern of disclosure
consists of rules varying with each Member State as to the informa-
tion which companies must disclose and the manner in which such
disclosure is made. A coordination of disclosure procedures would
be an important step toward assuring greater legal security in trans-
actions involving companies organized in different Member States.
In addition, under the present system, an enterprise operating in
each Member State could have to file six different reports with six
different deadlines, and keep six different sets of books on six differ-
ent accounting systems to comply with all of the national laws on dis-
closure. This situation clearly poses serious administrative problems
for multi-state companies. The elimination of the diverse disclosure
requirements would reduce the administrative burden on enterprises
which have establishments in several states.
Finally, disclosure, unlike many provisions of company law, can
have an effect on competitive conditions. Those firms which are
placed under stricter disclosure requirements by local law could be
46 For a general comparative discussion of the corporate laws of the
Member States, see P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, LE REGImE DES SOCITES PAR ACTIONS
ET LUE ADMINISTRATION EN DROIT COAARUE (1960).
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at a disadvantage in markets where the rules were less strict. In a
highly competitive sector of the economy, differences in disclosure
requirements could be of great importance.
For these reasons, a harmonization of disclosure provisions
clearly falls within the scope of Article 54(3) (g). A coordination
will help to minimize the risks of dealing with a foreign company
and at the same time ease the burdens of overlapping regulations
with respect to companies exercising their establishment rights in
several Member States. However, existing disclosure requirements of
the Member States differ radically, and coordination necessarily will
be difficult. An examination of the current disclosure requirements
of Germany and of Belgium will serve to illustrate some of these
problems.
1. The National Law-Germany
The basic instrument for disclosure of legal and financial informa-
tion about companies in Germany is the Commercial Register (Han-
delsregister) 4 which is kept by the court of each district. Information
which is required to be made public is deposited in the Register.
After deposit, the information is published in the official journal
(Bundesanzeiger), and in one other paper chosen by the court. Third
parties may rely on information contained in the Register, and such
information is available to all.48 The disclosure requirements for the
corporation (AG) and for the limited liability company (GmbH) dif-
fer, however, and must be considered separately.
a. Corporation
When a corporation is formed, specified documents must be
filed in the Commercial Register.49 These documents include the by-
laws of the corporation, the names of the directors and supervisors,
the amount of paid-in capital, and the "formation report" (Grilnd-
ungsbericht), which discloses the relation of the promoters to the
new corporation. In addition to the filing of documents, AG Law sec-
tion 34 requires disclosure of the amounts received for the shares
and, if property was received, a statement on the value of the prop-
erty. Finally, AG Law section 39(2) deals with disclosure of those
authorized to bind the corporation.
In addition to this rather extensive disclosure at formation, cor-
47 Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] § 8 (C.H. Beck 1966).
48 Id. §§ 9-10, 15. Special rules apply if the third party knew of facts
different from those disclosed in the Register.
49 Aktiengesetz § 37 (C.H. Beck 1968) [hereinafter cited as AG LAw].
Germany enacted a new corporate statute in 1965. Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965]
BGBI. I 1089. All citations refer to the 1965 legislation unless otherwise noted.
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porations are also required to publish annual reports containing a
balance sheet and profit and loss statement. 0 The new AG Law of
1965 sets forth very detailed and comprehensive rules as to the in-
formation which must be disclosed in the annual report and the ac-
counting principles which must be used when drawing up the profit
and loss statement and balance sheet.51 Section 151 gives the forms
which the financial statements must follow, and sections 153 and
155 set down the principles of valuation which must be used. The
basic rules are the cost less depreciation method for capital assets,
and lower of cost or market method for inventory.52  Section 162
requires that the financial statements be examined by qualified audi-
tors before submission to the shareholders.
b. Limited Liability Company
The situation is somewhat different as to the disclosure require-
ments for the limited liability company. Upon the formation of a
limited liability company, sections 8 and 10 of the GmbH Law5 3 re-
quire the deposit in the Commercial Register at the seat of the limited
liability company of a copy of the by-laws, a list of the shareholders
and managers, and the initial capital. If shares are issued for prop-
erty that fact must also be indicated in the Register.54
With respect to the annual report, however, only those limited
liability companies engaged in the banking business must publish
a yearly balance sheet and profit and loss statement. 5 All other
50 AG LAW § 177. It is on the basis of the annual report that the decision
as to the payment of dividends is made. Unlike the American practice, in Ger-
many the shareholders and not the management control the payment of divi-
dends. The management draws up a financial statement for the year, which
is presented to the shareholders for approval. After approval, the sharehold-
ers vote as to whether a portion of the profit, if any, should be paid out in
dividends or left in the company. AG LAw § 58.
51 AG LAw §§ 148-62. Corporations whose stock is traded on a stock
exchange must also comply with certain additional disclosure requirements
set out in the Bbrsengesetz (Stock Market Law).
52 The new disclosure provisions are considerably stricter and more de-
tailed than the old requirements and were intended to eliminate the practice
of an accumulation of "hidden reserves" by the corporation. In the past,
management would present financial statements which understated asset
values. This would result in less profit for the shareholders to vote as a di-
vidend, and the "hidden reserve" thus created would have in effect been
reinvested in the business without the explicit approval of the shareholders.
For an analysis of the new votes, see Esser, Gliederungsvorschriften, Bewer-
tung, Gewinnverwendung und Pflichtangaben noch dem Aktiengesetz 1965,
10 DiE AxT=NGESELLSCHAFT 360 (1965).
53 Law of April 20, 1892, [1892] RGBL. 477 [hereinafter cited as GivmH
LAW].
54 Id. § 5.
55 Id. § 41.
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limited liability companies, no matter how large, are free from this
requirement and need make no public disclosure of their financial
affairs.
This rule was thought by its proponents to conform to the closed
and personal nature of the limited liability company. Limited lia-
bility company shares are not easily transferred and are not traded
publicly. It was felt that since no appeal was to be made to the
public capital market, there should be no requirement of publicity.5
Early commentators criticized this policy, noting that third par-
ties had an interest in knowing the financial status of the limited
liability company.57 The exemption of the limited liability company
from publicity requirements became increasingly difficult to justify as
more large companies took the limited liability form,58 and there
have been many suggestions for change.59 The corporate law reforms
of 1965, however, did little to alter the requirements regarding limited
liability company publicity, except in the limited situation covered
by AG Law section 329.60
2. The National Law-Belgium
a. Corporation
As in Germany, the Belgian Company Code requires a rather
extensive disclosure by a corporation (S.A.) upon its formation.
The names of the founders, the articles of incorporation, and data
56 See Die handelsrechtliche Publizitft ausserhalb der Aktiengesellschaft,
45 VERHANDLuNGExN DES FfiUNDVIERzIGSTEN DEUTScHEN JURISTENTAGS [herein-
after cited as DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG] II, pt. 4, at 47 (1964).
57 Liebmann, Die Reform der Geseflachaft mit beschrlnkter Haftung, 15
DEUTScHE JURIsTEN-ZEIT NG 675, 681 (1910); Liebmann, Die Gesellschaft mit
beschrfinkter Haftung in der Praxis, 6 DEuTscHE JunisTEN-ZEIrTUG 327, 329
(1902).
58 In 1960, fifteen of the 100 largest firms and 294 of the 1,000 largest
firms were limited liability companies. [1960] BUNDESTAG DRUCKSACHE ser.
IV, at 2320.
59 Several suggestions for extending publication requirements to the
GmbH have been presented to the Bundestag. See [1962] BUNDESTAG DRUCK-
SACHE ser. IV, at 203; [1960] BuNiDESTAG DRUCKSACHE ser. m, at 2278. The
problem was also considered extensively by the German bar in 1964. See Die
handelsrechtliche Publizitit ausserhalb der Aktiengesellschaft, supra note 56.
On May 22, 1968, legislation was again proposed which would require dis-
closure of financial information by larger GmbH's. BUNDESRAT DRuCKSACHE
269/68.
60 As part of the regulation of combines (Konzerne), AG LAw § 329
requires a GmbH which controls an AG to make public consolidated financial
data. In addition, it appears that in practice the new corporate regulations
on accounting methods are having some effect on GmbH's. See PRIcE, WATER-
HOUSE & Co., INFORMvIATIoN GUIDE FOR DoiNG BusINEss IN GERmANY 14-15
(1967). This does not extend of course to the obligation imposed on corpo-
rations to make financial information public.
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regarding the cash and non-cash contributions to capital all must be
published in the official journal (Moniteur beige).61 Later amend-
ments-and in particular any modification of the powers of repre-
sentatives of the company-must also be published.2
Each year the directors of the corporation are required to pre-
pare a profit and loss statement and a balance sheet.6 3 All share-
holders are entitled to request a copy of this report before the
annual meeting when the report is submitted to them for their ap-
proval.64 Article 80 of the Company Code stipulates that the balance
sheet and profit and loss statement be published in the official jour-
nal after they have been submitted to the shareholders. The financial
statements of the company must be reviewed by an auditor,65 but there
is no requirement that the auditor have special qualifications or
expertise.(6
The accounting standards imposed by the Company Code are ex-
ceedingly vague. Article 77 requires only that the balance sheet be
divided into assets and liabilities, that on the asset side there be
drawn a distinction between liquid and non-liquid assets, and that
on the liability side the secured and unsecured liabilities be distin-
guished. This complete lack of accounting standards did not happen
by chance. The legislative history of the Company Code provisions
shows a conscious decision against imposing a strict statutory pat-
tern, leaving it to the directors to "declare the situation as they see
it."'6 7 Given this vague statutory guidance, the practice has none-
theless developed of a lower of cost or market method for valuation
of inventory 68 and the cost less depreciation method (with some ex-
ceptions not pertinent here) for valuation of capital assets.0 9
b. Limited Liability Company
On the formation of a socidtg de personnes & responsabiliti limitge
61 CODE DE Co1n1nMcE LIV. tit. IX, art. I, §§ 9-10 (J. Servais & E.
Mechelynck ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as COMWANY CODE].
62 Id. § 12
63 Id. § 77.
64 Id. § 78.
65 Id. §§ 65, 77.
66 The situation is different if the corporation's shares are publicly held.
Then auditors must be chosen from a group of qualified accountants. Id. art.
54. Public issuance of securities is regulated by the Commission bancaire
which has additional disclosure requirements.
67 Session of May 9, 1905, [1905] ANNALEs PARmLEMETAEs-SENAT 317.
One Deputy argued that accounting standards did not matter since share-
holders never came to meetings anyway and even if they did, they did not
read the balance sheets.
68 Ministbre Public et van Renterghem v. Schelfaut, [1931] Pasicrisie
Belge [Pas. B.] II. 169 (Cour d'appel de Gand).
69 J. VA RYN, PanmciPEs DE DROIT COMMERcIAL 457 (1954).
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(S.P.R.L.), the Belgian version of the limited liability company, the
names of the shareholders, the names of the managers and their
powers, and the initial capital must be published.70 In addition, un-
like the limited liability company in Germany, the Belgian limited
liability company must make public an annual balance sheet and
profit and loss statement of the same type required of a corpor-
tion.7 1
When the adoption of a limited liability company form in Belgium
was being considered in the early 1930's, there was much discussion
as to whether to follow the German rule exempting the limited lia-
bility company from disclosure requirements. When the bill was
before the Senate, an amendment was proposed which would have
followed the German rule as to the publicity requirements of the
limited liability company.72 The principal argument in favor of the
amendment was the same as that made in Germany; namely, that
the limited liability company did not look to the public capital market
and was basically a personal organization. This position was re-
jected, however, and the amendment defeated. It was felt by a ma-
jority of the legislators that it was "indispensable that those who
enter into business relations with such a private company be able to
inform themselves over its condition. '78 As a concession to the pri-
vate nature of the limited liability company, this type of business en-
tity was not required to publish its annual report in the official
journal, as was the corporation, but was required only to file it with
the local Commercial Court.7 4
3. Disclosure Requirements of the Company Law Directive
The divergence between Belgian and German law on disclosure
of information by companies is exemplary of the considerable diversity
found in the existing disclosure requirements of the Member States.
The basic thrust of the Directive is to increase the amount of dis-
closure necessary on the part of companies. Article 2(1) of the Di-
rective requires that Member States ensure the mandatory publica-
tion of the act constituting the company, the by-laws, the subscribed
capital, and the names of individuals having authority to represent the
company. In addition, important corporate events such as the ap-
pointment of liquidators or a transfer of seat must be disclosed.
The disclosure required by the Directive is to be made by filling
in a central or commercial register and by publication in an official
70 COMPANY CODE § 7(6).
71 Id. art. 137 makes applicable to the S.P.R.L. the publicity requirements
of arts. 77-79.
72 Session of May 12, 1932, [1932] ANNALEs PARLEMENTAIRES - SENAT 1005.
73 Id. at 1006.
74 COMPANY CODE § 137.
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journal.75 The publication may be either a copy of the actual ma-
terial filed in the register or a notation referring to the material.
Copies of the documents filed must be available to anyone requesting
them, at a nominal cost. In the event of a difference between the
information published and the information on deposit, a third party
may rely on either source unless he was aware the discrepancy ex-
isted. In order to make access to this information as wide as pos-
sible, companies must indicate on their letterheads and order forms
the location of the registry in which the company files.76
Disclosure of this type of general information about the company's
status and history involves no great departure from the existing
publicity requirements which exists in the German and Belgian law,
though the Directive does set up a uniform method of disclosure.
Article 2(1) (f) of the Directive, however, requires the publication
by companies of an annual balance sheet and profit and loss state-
ment. Here the Directive initiates an important change. In addition
to requiring corporations to publish financial data, the Directive re-
quires additionally that limited liability companies also must make
financial information public. The application of balance sheet and
profit and loss statement disclosure requirements to limited lia-
bility companies, however, is deferred until a second directive con-
cerning the coordination of the contents of these financial documents
has been issued.7 7 The second directive, which is to be forthcoming
within two years, will also exempt limited liability companies below
a certain size from publicity requirements.7 8
This requirement of the final text of the Directive-that limited
liability companies must disclose financial data-will necessitate radi-
cal changes in the existing company law of the Member States. It
has been a subject of considerable debate since the promulgation of
the first draft directive.7u The first draft directive required publica-
75 First Company Law Directive arts. 3(1), 3(4). The original draft of
the Directive left the choice of the means of publication up to the Member
States. The Council, however, acting on the advice of the Economic and
Social Committee, stipulated the method of publication in the final text of
the Directive. This step should simplify the access of third parties to the
published information.
76 Id. art. 4. The papers must indicate the legal form of the company.
If the company is in liquidation, that fact must also be noted. If, as is the
case in some Member States, the capitalization of the company is shown on
the letterhead, the amount of paid-in capital must be distinguished from the
subscribed capital.
77 Id. art. 2 (1) (f).
78 Id.
79 An interesting series of articles appeared in the German publication
GivmH-RuNDscHAu (GMBH R.) shortly after the announcement of the draft
directive. The draft directive proposal that GmbH's disclose financial state-
ments was asserted to exceed the competence of the Commission and to violate
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tion of financial data by limited liability companies, but exempted
from its publication requirements those companies with balance
sheet assets of less than 1,000,000 units of account.8 0  This proposal
drew sharp reaction from the Dutch commentators in particular, for
the special problems it would raise in the Netherlands. 81
Under Dutch law, the limited liability company form is un-
known and businesses are generally organized as corporations if they
wish the advantage of limited liability. Since the first draft direc-
tive required disclosure for all corporations but exempted limited
liability companies under a certain size, small corporations organized
under Dutch law would have been at a disadvantage because they
would have to make disclosures not demanded of the corresponding
legal form in other countries. The second draft of the Directive cor-
rected this problem by providing for a special category of "close"
Dutch corporations which would be treated like limited liability com-
panies for the purpose of disclosure, and this approach is followed
in the final Directive.8 2 The Directive leaves open, however, the
question of the size of the limited liability company and the Dutch
close corporation which will be exempted from the disclosure require-
ments. This problem will be covered in the second directive.8
The Council decision to extend disclosure requirements to limited
liability companies was a sound one. The general need for readily
accessible information about foreign companies increases as intra-
Community trade develops and new international market opportuni-
ties are utilized by smaller companies. An exemption from disclosure
for limited liability companies below a certain size will allow the
Member States to have diverse disclosure regulations for those
companies whose activities are primarily domestic, while requiring a
the German constitutional privilege of privacy. Its adoption, the articles im-
plied, would lead to economic chaos throughout the Market. See 55 GimVH R.
23, 52, 53, 151, 156 (1964). The articles culminated with a telegram to the
Council, the Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee which sum-
marized all the objections to publication for GmbH's and demanded that the
provision be stricken from the Directive. Id. at 173. In a more scholarly
analysis of the problem, the German Bar Association concluded that some
kind of publication of the financial statements of GmbH's was needed, though
differences of opinion still exist as to the extent of such publication. See 45
DEuTscHmR JURISTENTAG 69-74.
80 A unit of account is equal to 0.88867088 grams of gold or the value of
the United States dollar. [1960] E.E.C. 3.0. 1943.
81 E.g., L~wensgteyn, De voorschriften met betrekTking tot de openbaar-
making in het ontwerp eerste richtlijn, [1964-65] DE NAMsoozE VEN ooTs-
cHAP 47. This perhaps explains the negative reaction of the Dutch to proceed-
ings under Article 54(3) (g) generally. See generally Scholten, supra note 33,
at 379.
82 First Company Law Directive art. 2 (2).
88 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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uniform disclosure on the part of larger limited liability companies
with activities of an international character.
A failure by the Council to apply disclosure requirements to
larger limited liability companies could have had unfortunate results.
As indicated above,8 4 limited liability companies in Belgium are al-
ready required to make disclosure of financial data. If other limited
liability companies were free to avoid disclosure, Belgian companies
would be at a disadvantage and there would be pressure to drop
publicity even in Belgium.8 5 In addition, if limited liability companies
were exempt from disclosure, there is a possibility that many busi-
nesses would use this legal form to escape the publicity required of
the corporation.
The present situation in Germany indicates that this fear of a
"flight into the limited liability company" may have some basis in
fact. After the enactment of the stricter disclosure requirements for
corporations,8 6 unofficial sources reported some German corporations
turning to the limited liability company form to circumvent the new
disclosure procedures.8 7 The decision of the Council to announce its
approval in principle of disclosure by limited liability companies, while
deferring action on the details of the disclosure provisions, will hope-
fully avoid this sort of problem.
A second matter on which the Directive defers action is the
coordination of the contents of balance sheets and profit and loss
statements. This coordination presumably will cover the method of
presentation in the financial statements as well as the accounting
principles on which they are based. An extensive coordination of ac-
counting methods would not seem necessary to ensure adequate dis-
closure as long as certain basic principles can be made uniform.
Most important in this regard would be agreement as to the method
of valuation to be used in financial statements. In Germany and Bel-
gium, for example, despite the differences in details of accounting
practice, there seems to be general agreement on the use of a cost
less depreciation method for the valuation of capital assets, and the
lower of cost or market method for inventory.8  These principles
could form the basis for the coordination of financial statement presen-
tation to be undertaken in the future directive.
84 See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
85 See [1964] BuzLL. E.E.C. 14 (Supp. No. 3).
86 See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
87 "[M]ore than two dozen" large companies have changed from the
Aktiengesellschaft form and become GmbH's in order to avoid the stricter
disclosure requirements in the new AG Law of 1965. NEwswEEK, Jan. 24,
1966, at 68. See also Sanders, Die Europiische Aktiengesellschaft, 12 DiE
AKzTNGEsELScHAFT 344, 347 (1967).
88 See text accompanying notes 52, 68-69 supra.
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C. Effect of Limitations on the Power of Company
Representatives
Companies of necessity act through representatives, but not every
act of the representative binds the company. As was the case with
disclosure requirements, varying rules have been developed in Mem-
ber States concerning the ability of third parties to enforce against
a company a contract entered into by representatives acting in the
name of the company. This diversity threatens the legal security of
intra-Community transactions, for it results in the inability of a
third party to be certain that his dealings with a representative of a
foreign company will result in a binding commitment. Harmoniza-
tion of the rules on representation under Article 54(3) (g) would
reduce the danger of confusion over power of representation and
would remove an impediment to greater intra-Community business.
Recent developments with respect to recognition of companies
also have made the lack of uniform rules on representation more
significant. Acting under Article 220 (3), the Member States signed a
Convention on February 29, 1968 dealing with the mutual recognition
of companies.89 This Convention is awaiting ratification by the na-
tional governments. Under the terms of the Convention, Member
States are required to recognize companies formed in accordance
with the laws of the other Member States. More important for
purposes of Article 54(3) (g), the Convention provides that in gen-
eral the "capacity" of the recognized company will be determined in
accordance with the law of the country under which the company
was "established".90 Thus, concerning questions of capacity, and in
particular with respect to the effect of limitations on the power of
a company representative, the receiving state will not be permitted
to apply its own law to foreign corporations after the Convention is
ratified.9 1
89 Convention Relating to the Mutual Recognition of Companies and
Legal Persons, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 11 6083-6107 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Recognition Convention]. See also Cerexhe, La Reconnaissance Mutuelle
des Socigt6s et Personnes Morales dans la Communautg Economique Europ6-
ene, [1968] REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 578 (general discussion of the
Convention).
90 Recognition Convention 6090 (art. 6). The determination of legal
capacity by reference to the law of the state of "establishment" instead of the
traditional siege social approach may be part of a general Continental move-
ment in the direction of an "incorporation" rather than "seat" analysis of
corporate problems. See generally Drobnig, Conflict of Laws and the Euro-
pean Economic Community, Am. J. Compnr. L. 204, 210-11 (1967); Leleux supra
note 35, at 148-49.
91 Article 7 allows a Member State to deny a foreign company rights
and powers which it does not accord to its own companies, but this article
would not affect the situation in which the foreign company's representative
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Coordination of national law provisions will be essential to re-
duce the dangers to legal security implicit in the recognition rules set
out in the Convention 2 A coordination of rules on representation
can be based on Article 54(3) (g), since it has the requisite connection
with freedom of establishment and legal security. Such a coordi-
nation presents certain problems, however, as the following examina-
tion of the law in Germany and France will show.
1. The National Law-Germany
Generally, the power of a representative to bind his company may
be restricted in two ways. First, there may be an explicit pro-
vision in the by-laws or charter of the company limiting the power of
a manager or board of directors to enter into certain transactions.
Secondly, the Continental version of the ultra vires doctrine may
operate to limit the power of a representative to bind the company.
According to this latter theory of corporate powers, the company is
able to act only within the purposes, the objet social, for which the
company was established. Hence an act by a representative, though
within the scope of his authority, does not commit the corporation
unless it is encompassed within the objet social3
a. Corporation
The German law firmly rejects both these limitations so far as
dealings with third parties are concerned. As to the corporation, sec-
tion 78(1) of the AG Law states that "[tihe Board of Managers
(Vorstand) represents the corporation both in and out of court. '94
has less authority under foreign law than similar local representatives. Rec-
ognition Convention 6091 (art. 7). It is exactly this problem which creates
the greatest risks to legal security.
92 At least one commentator has suggested that ratification of the Con-
vention should be withheld until a further coordination of company law under
Article 54(3) (g) has taken place. Drobnig, Kritische Bemerkangen zum
Vorentwurf eines EWG-Obereinkommes fiber Anerkennung von Gesellsch-
aften, 129 Z.H.R. 93, 117 (1966-67).
93 See P. VAN ONvMIsr.AGRE, LE REGnvM DES SociETEs PAR AcTIONS ET LEUR
ADiNIsTRAToN Ex DROIT COMPARE 475 (1960), for a discussion of the ultra
vires doctrine in Europe.
94 Under German corporate law the day-to-day business of the corpora-
tion is handled by the Board of Managers. The Board is appointed by the
Supervisory Council (Aufsichtsrat) which is in turn elected by the share-
holders and in some cases has representatives of the corporation's employees.
See note 154 infra. The -Supervisory Council oversees the activities of the
Managers and reports to the shareholders. AG LAW' § 111. Neither institu-
tion is exactly analogous to the American Board of Directors, though both
have some common elements. For a general discussion of German corporate
organization, see Stroble, Principles of the German Law of Partnerships and
Corporations, in 1 DOING BusnvEss ABROAD 114 (H. Landau ed, 1962).
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The powers of the Board must be exercised jointly unless the by-laws
provide otherwise. Powers may be delegated in the by-laws to one or
several members of the Board and may be exercised in conjunction
with a general agent (Prokura).95 Section 82(1) provides that the
power of representation (Vertretungsbefugnis) of the Board of Man-
agers may not be limited with respect to third parties, though limi-
tations can have effect on the internal relations between the Board
and the corporation. Both the commentators9" and the courts9" have
interpreted this broad grant of power to the Board as including a
rejection of the doctrine of objet social.
A literally unlimited power of representation, however, would be
unworkable as well as unnecessary to fulfill the commercial needs for
legal security, and hence some limitations have developed. For ex-
ample, certain important corporate actions require shareholder or
Supervisory Council approval.98 In addition, in day-to-day business
transactions, if the third party knew or should have known of the
limitations on the manager's power, the corporation is not bound. 9
b. Limited Liability Company
Similar rules apply to the German limited liability company.
Section 35 of the GmbH Law provides that the limited liability com-
pany is to be represented in all matters by its managers (Gesch'ftsfiih-
rer). They exercise the powers of representation jointly, unless the
95 AG LAw § 78(2)-(4).
96 A. BAUMBACH & A. HUEcK, AKTIENGESETZ 245 (1968); R. TEicHmAN &
W. KOEHLE, AKTENGESETZ 165 (1950). The Teichmann-Koehler commentary
deals with the old AG Law of 1937. As far as representation is concerned,
however, the rules in the new AG Law of 1965 correspond exactly to 1937
law. Hence, both case law and commentary on the 1937 statute would seem
applicable in interpreting the present AG Law.
97 The ultra vires doctrine was specifically rejected in a judgment which
held a corporation bound by a contract entered into by its managers to buy
shares in another company even though such action exceeded the company's
objet social as laid down in the charter. Judgment of Nov. 19, 1926, 115 RGZ
246. The court stated: "The power to represent of the Board of Managers
is not limited by the purposes (satzungsmiissiger Zweck) of the company.
Even when an action of the Board of Managers exceeds the objet social
(Gegenstand des Unternehmens), the binding force of such action is not
affected." Id. at 249.
98 E.g. AG LAw § 52 (contracts involving over one-tenth of the corpora-
tion's capital and entered into within two years after formation must be
approved by the shareholders); AG LAw § 89 (loans to managers require
Supervisory Council approval); AG LAW § 340 (three-quarters majority
shareholder approval must be obtained for merger of the corporation).
99 This is partly a judicially-developed doctrine (see Judgment of Nov.
5, 1934, 145 RGZ 311) and is partly based on the requirements of good
faith and honesty (Treu und Glauben) of Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)
art, 242 (1965), which have been applied to all contract situations.
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by-laws state otherwise. But section 37 (2) stipulates that "[a] gainst
third parties, limitations on the powers of the managers to represent
the company have no legal effect," and again this broad grant of
powers has been interpreted as a rejection of any limitations based
on the objet social concept. 00
The German statutory pattern thus gives wide protection to third
parties dealing with companies. This concern for the rights of third
parties can be traced to the Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1896. That
Code made an important distinction between Auftrag, or the internal
relation between principal and agent, and Vollmacht, the power of
the agent to represent and bind his principal in dealing with third
parties. Limitations contained in the Auftrag relation did not re-
strict the Vollmacht of the agent, and had no effect against third
parties.1 1 This same idea was incorporated into the company law
provisions, which rejected limitations on the power of representa-
tives where third party interests were concerned.
2. The National Law-France
The Law of July 24, 1966,102 the first extensive reform of French
company law in this century, has made important changes in the law
on representation and, though the development of the law on repre-
sentation in France has taken a considerably different path than
in Germany, the final results are not too dissimilar. In order to
understand the existing French law, it is necessary to review briefly
the history of the present provisions.
a. Corporation-Historical
Article 22 of the Law of July 24, 1867,103 the prior basic French
corporate statute, provided that the corporation was to be managed
by one or more agents (mandataire) who were to be selected from
among the shareholders. In contrast to the German law,104 there
was no reference to the effect of limitations on the power of the
mandataire to represent the company. The French courts, when
faced with a problem of how to treat these limitations, turned to the
100 See SCHOLZ, KOmMrENTAR zum GrsH-GEsEz 417 (5th ed. 1960).
Though the courts have never ruled on the matter, the principles developed
with respect to corporations are thought to apply to limited liability compa-
nies.
101 BGB §§ 167, 662. Similarly, restrictions on the power to represent of
a general commercial agent (Prolcura) are not effective against third parties.
HGB § 50.
102 [1966] J.O. 6402 [hereinafter cited as New Company Law].
103 [1867] Bulletin des Lois 94 (11th Series) [hereinafter cited as Old
Company Law].
104 See text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
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general principles of mandat'0 5 as codified in the Code Civile. Article
1989 of the Code states that an agent (mandataire) can do nothing
beyond what is set out in his mandate. Article 1998 provides that the
principal is not bound by an act done by the agent outside the scope
of the mandate unless he ratifies the act.1° 6 Applying these concepts
to the corporate context, the French courts concluded that limitations
on the powers of corporate representatives were effective against third
parties, and that the corporation was not bound by the acts of its
representative exceeding the express power granted.10 7
In addition to enforcing such limitations on the power to repre-
sent, the old French law also accepted the principle of ultra vires.
The powers of the corporation were to be exercised always within
the objet social of the corporation as set out in the charter. 0 8 Though
105 Roughly translated "agency," though there are some important dif-
ferences between the French and American institutions.
106 It is interesting to note the historical reasons for the different devel-
opment of Au'trag and Vollmacht in Germany and mandat in France. In its
Roman origins the mandate contract was simply an agreement by one person
to perform a service for another without compensation. H. JoLowIcz,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 311 (1952). It had
nothing to do with the power to represent in the sense of binding the prin-
cipal in contracts with third parties. In the Middle Ages, the power to rep-
resent became combined with the mandate. However, the power to represent
extended only as far as the mandate, i.e., only to the extent of the agreement
between the parties. This combination of mandate and power to represent
was taken into the French Law. Code Civile [C. Civ.] art. 1984 (67e ed. Petits
Codes Dalloz 1968). Hence the result that restrictions between principal and
agent are effective against third parties. In Germany, however, the internal
aspects of the relation, i.e., the mandate or Auftrag, were separated from the
power to represent, the Vollmacht, and were regulated independently. As a
result, restrictions in the internal aspect of the relation did not limit the power
to represent.
107 See, e.g., Meyer v. .tablissements Mar~chal, [1946] La Semaine Juri-
dique [Sem. Jur.] IL 2970 (Cour d'appel, Paris) (limitation in by-laws requir-
ing signatures of two directors held effective); Walter v. Moreau, [1891] Re-
cueil Priodique et Critique [D.P.] I. 339 (Cass. ch. req.) (mandate principles
followed in determining corporation's liability on notes executed by its di-
rectors). The harsh result of giving effect to internal limitations was amelio-
rated somewhat by the doctrine of mandat apparent.
Like the Anglo-American concept of apparent authority, the mandat
apparent doctrine allowed the third party to enforce obligations against the
corporation, even where actual power to represent was lacking, if the company
representative was carrying out a function usual for one in his position. See,
e.g., Penant v. Balbarie et Haguenauer, [1936] Recueil Sirey (S. Jur.) I. 223
(Cass. ch. req.).
The scope and limits of the doctrine, however, were far from clear. See
P. VAN OMMESLAGHE, supra note 93, at 486; L~aut6, Le mandat apparent dans
ses rapports avec las thgorie generale de Vapparence, 45 REvuE TRnvMsTREIu
DE DROIT CivIL 288 (1947).
108 See J. ESCARAA & J. RAuLT, LEs SOCiETES Co aciA .Es 66 (1950); Cor-
donner, L'object Social, [1952] Recueil Dalloz 171.
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the potential danger for third parties created by the objet social
doctrine was somewhat limited by the practice of having a broad
statement of purposes in the charter,10 9 the possibility that a given
transaction could be found to be outside the scope of the corporate
purpose remained a real one.110
b. Limited Liability Company-Historical
The law with respect to the power of representation has de-
veloped somewhat differently with respect to the French limited lia-
bility company, the socidtg & responsabilit6 limitge (S.A.R.L.). The
limited liability company form was first introduced in France in 1925,
and was modeled on the German GmbH statute."' Understandably,
the rules on power of representation showed their origin. Article 24
of the Law of March 7, 1925112 provided that the limited liability
company was to be managed by one or more agents who were to have
full and complete authority to act in the name of the company. The
statute did not, however, leave the relation of the third parties to
the company to be determined by the mandat rules as in the case
of the corporation. It provided that "any private agreement limiting
the power of managers is without effect as regards third parties."
However, the value of this statute in increasing the protection given
third parties was undermined to some extent by the application of the
doctrine of objet social to the limited liability company by the
courts.""
c. Current Law
The New Company Law of July 24, 1966 follows the old law
quite closely with respect to the power of limited liability company
managers. By articles 14 and 49 of the new statute, limitations on
the power of managers of a limited liability company "are of no
109 1 G. RIPERT, TRAITE ELEmENTAIRE DE DROIT COMVMERCIAL 331 (3d ed.
1959).
110 In Belgium, where the French doctrine is followed, the Cour de Cassa-
tion held in 1957 that a corporation organized to export goods could not deal
as a commission agent in imports since such activity was outside the objects
of the corporation. Soci6t6 Anonyme Overseas Suppliers Ltd. v. Soci6t6 de
Droit Anglais Gilbert Caul and Cy. Ltd., [1957] Pas. B. 1176 (Cass.). Presum-
ably Luxembourg also would follow the French and Belgian decisions.
111 G. RiPERT, TRArTE ELEMmETAIRE DE DROIT ComIvIERcIAL 476 (6th ed.
1968).
112 Law of March 7, 1925, art. 24, 25 COLLECTION DEs Lois 119 (1925).
113 See, e.g., Buston et cie v. Soci6t6 Bonneterie du Loiret, [1934] JOURNAL
DES SOCiETES CivnrLs ET COMmERCiALES [JouR. Soc.] 698 (Trib. comm. de Mon-
targis) (S.A.R.L. organized to run a retail store could not engage in dealings in
the cacao commodity market).
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effect with regard to third parties." 1 4 The corporate rules on repre-
sentation, however, have been changed considerably.
The new law provides alternative methods for the organization
of corporate management. The by-laws of the corporation may
provide that the corporation is to be managed either by a Board of
Directors and a President, somewhat in the American manner, or by
a Board of Managers and a Supervisory Council, along the lines of
the German corporate structure.115 In either case, however, the stat-
ute expressly states that limitations on the power of those who ac-
cording to law represent the corporation may not be invoked against
third parties."06
Because of these changes, a third party dealing with a corporation
in the ordinary course of business need have no fear, as had been the
situation under the prior law, of internal limitations on the powers of
Directors or Managers."17 However, despite the increased protection
given to third parties in the new statute with respect to attempts to
limit powers internally, the doctrine of objet social is still retained.
The power of representation of both corporations and limited lia-
bility companies may still be exercised only "within the limits of the
corporate purposes," and a commitment on the part of a company can
still be found to be unenforceable on the basis that it does not fall
within the objet social of the company." 8
3. The Directive Provisions on Representation
A coordination of the rules on representation presents squarely
the problem of choosing between the competing claims of third parties
and shareholders. In France, the law has developed to protect the
shareholder by allowing the company to avoid commitments in cer-
tain circumstances. In Germany, the interests of third parties have
always been preferred.
The German approach clearly seems best suited to the needs of
expanding intra-Community business. The risk that a company repre-
sentative might enter into an unauthorized transaction should fall
on the shareholders rather than the third party since they have
chosen him and are in a position, either directly or indirectly, to
oversee his activities. This is especially true when the third party
is dealing with a company organized in another Member State, for
114 New Company Law arts. 14, 49.
"15 Id. art. 118.
116 Id. arts. 98, 124.
117 Major corporate actions outside of the ordinary course of business may
require shareholder approval. For example, the New Company Law requires
shareholder approval for a transfer of all of the company's assets. Id. art. 396.
118 Id. arts. 14, 98, 124.
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in that case an investigation into the actual authority of the repre-
sentative could be quite difficult. In fact, the French law has been
shown also to be moving in this direction.
As might be expected, the Directive follows the pattern of the
German law on representation. Article 9 (2) of the Directive provides
that limitations imposed on the power of "organs" representing the
company by the by-laws or by the internal decisions of the company
may never be invoked against third parties even though they have
been published. Thus, third parties are protected against any hid-
den limitations and, in addition, are not required to interpret the
scope of limitations which have been made public. The only ex-
ception to the general rule is that if the existing company law allows
a delegation of powers in the by-laws to one or several persons, the
national law may provide that such delegation may be invoked against
third parties, as long as it has been disclosed by filing and publica-
tion.119 This procedure does not unduly burden third parties since
they are required only to make sure that the company representa-
tives with whom they are dealing are named in the documents on
deposit in the Commercial Register.
It is interesting to note that Article 9 (2) of the Directive states
that internal limitations may never be invoked against third parties.
As discussed in the examination of German law,1 20 where a wide
power of representation traditionally has been recognized, limita-
tions are nonetheless effective if the third party had knowledge of
them. This problem was raised in the debates in the European
Parliament,12 1 and the Parliamentary draft of the directive required
that third parties be "in good faith" (de bonne foi) to avoid internal
limitations on a representative's authority. 22 The Council, however,
omitted this requirement in the final Directive. Presumably it was
felt that the test was too difficult to apply. A better solution
would have been to put the burden of proof of bad faith on the com-
pany, thus protecting third parties in all situations in which they de-
serve protection, and conforming to the Directive's approach regard-
ing the solution of the objet social problem. 23
With respect to the objet social limitation on company obliga-
119 First Company Law Directive, supra note 7, art. 9(3).
120 See text accompanying note 99 supra.
121 [1966-1967] Eur. PARL. DEB. No. 85, at 63 (May 11, 1966).
122 Id. at 105.
123 Article 7(1) likewise provides that defects in the appointment of com-
pany representatives, while not generally effective against third parties, may
be invoked by the company if it can prove that the third party knew of the
defect. First Company Law Directive art. 7(1). For a critical examination of
this portion of the Directive in its draft form, see Scholten, supra note 33, at
397-98.
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tions, the Directive has taken something of a compromise position.
Article 9 (1) provides:
(1) The company shall be liable to third parties for acts of its
organs, even if such acts are not related to the company purpose, un-
less such acts exceed the powers that have been given or may be
given to such organs by law.
The Member States may, however, provide that the company
shall not be liable where such acts exceed the company purpose if it
can prove that a third party had knowledge of the fact that the act
exceeded the company purpose or under the circumstances could
have had knowledge thereof; the fact of publication of the by-laws in
itself shall not constitute such proof.
Thus, the objet social doctrine still may have some vitality in those
countries like France and Belgium in which it is presently accepted,
but only in the situation in which the third party reasonably can
be supposed to know that the company was acting beyond its scope.
The fact that the objet social of the company has been disclosed by
publication is not of itself enough to put the third party on notice.
The Directive correctly places on the company the burden of showing
that a third party could have known that an act exceeded the objet
social. Hence, such a person is spared from having to interpret the
limitations of the objet social at his own risk.
The Directive will thus require some changes in the existing
French law with respect to objet social since the present statutes
do not restrict the doctrine as does the Directive. However, the re-
cent French judicial decisions seem to be moving in the direction of
upholding limitations on representative power only in situations
where the third party had or should have had knowledge of the limi-
tations. Thus, the changes necessitated by the Directive will not be
revolutionary.1 24
The basic goal of the Directive provisions is to insure that third
parties dealing with foreign companies will not be exposed to limita-
tions on the power of the company's representative, and this com-
ports with the general objectives of Article 54(3) (g). However, the
approach employed by the Directive points up certain interesting and
unresolved problems. For example, in Article 9(1), the Directive
speaks in terms of the "organs" which represent the company and
states that those organs are able to bind the company only to the ex-
tent of the power granted them by the national company law. As
has been discussed, however, the bodies which represent the com-
pany can differ in both composition and function according to the na-
tional law. In France, for example, the President may be respon-
sible for the general management of the company while in Germany
124 See, e.g., Banque canadienne national v. Directeur gfnfral des impfts,
[1963] Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 277 (Cass. ass. plan. civ.). -See generally In-
ternal Market Comm'n Report, supra note 16, para. 68.
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the corresponding function is performed by the Board of Managers.
In addition, certain powers may be reserved under one national legal
system for the shareholders or the Supervisory Council while in
another Member State such powers are regularly exercised by the
directors.125 The same difficulty arises with respect to the authority
of company officers with less than full power to represent the com-
pany. Business needs often require that these officers be able to
commit the company within a limited sphere of activities.
The disposition of problems of this type is clearly beyond the
scope of the present Directive. To coordinate the basic structure of
the various forms of business entities in the Member States would be a
large task, involving considerable intrusion into national legal institu-
tions. It is questionable whether such an undertaking could be based
on Article 54(3) (g) since this seems to go well beyond coordinating
"protective provisions," and the Directive cannot be faulted for
failing to deal with problems of this magnitude. On the whole, how-
ever, short of such a radical undertaking, the coordination of the
rules as to the effect of internal limitations on the power of repre-
sentatives, together with the provisions for a uniform method of dis-
closure of information about company representatives, as now re-
quired by the Directive, should help to increase legal security in
day-to-day business transactions involving companies organized in
different Member States.
D. The Causes and Effects of Improper Incorporation
Limitations on the power of a company representative are not
the only threat to the rights of a third party dealing with a foreign
company. It is also possible that the company was not properly
formed and thus never came into existence under the laws of the
state of incorporation. In a domestic transaction it is relatively sim-
ple to protect against this danger by an investigation of the legal
status of the company and a determination of the effects of failure
to incorporate properly. As more business is carried on between
companies formed in different states, however, the difficulties in-
volved in such an investigation increase. Legal security would be
furthered if the grounds for declaration of nullity were coordinated
and the effects of such declaration minimized.126
125 See notes 98, 117 supra. For a discussion of this problem in the Neth-
erlands, see Sanders, supra note 87, at 345.
126 The expression "declaration of nullity" (Nichtigerkidrung) refers to
the procedures under the laws of the Member States whereby a company is
annulled and denied further legal existence. See, e.g., AG LAW § 275. It has
certain features in common with the Anglo-American quo warranto proceed-
ing though it may be brought by private parties. A declaration of nullity can
have varying effects, as the subsequent discussion indicates.
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The report of the Internal Market Commission of the Parlia-
ment on the first draft directive objected that problems of nullity
had no relation to freedom of establishment, and questioned whether
coordination in this area could be based on Article 54(3) (g).127 How-
ever, this approach is not particularly persuasive, for while annul-
ment and its effects may not be as important an area of company
law as is publicity, or restrictions on representative power, it still has
a clear relation to freedom of establishment. For example, the
possibility that a company established in branch or agency form in
the territory of another Member State could be found to be improp-
erly incorporated, and hence without legal existence, could bear on
the rights of third parties who had business relations with the for-
eign company. A declaration of nullity having retroactive effect
could jeopardize claims against the company and lead to an under-
standable reluctance to enter into dealings with foreign trading part-
ners. A coordination of the grounds of nullity, and more important,
a minimizing of the effects of nullity, would eliminate this problem.
In view of the similarity of existing company law provisions, such
coordination will not present any serious difficulties.
1. The National Law-France
Like the rules on representative power, the French law on nullity
has been altered significantly by the New Company Law of July 24,
1966, and it is helpful first to examine the state of the law prior to the
new statute. The old corporate statute listed a number of grounds
for a declaration of nullity. Failure to make proper publication of
the incorporation papers, defect in the form of the paper when
filed, failure to hold necessary organizational meetings, improper ap-
pointment of directors, and failure to issue properly the initial stock
all could result in a declaration of nullity. 28 In addition to the
specific statutory grounds, the French courts had also developed other
grounds for annulment based on the idea of the company as a form
of contract among the shareholders.129 Since company formation is
based on contract principles, all the usual defects (lack of consent of
all parties, fraud, duress, etc.) which would invalidate any contract
could lead to an annulment of the company.
180
While an annulment could not be used by the corporation as a
defense to claims by third parties, it could lead in one instance to a
subordination of the third party claims. The French courts had held
that the personal creditors of a shareholder in an improperly formed
127 Internal Market Comm'n Report para. 68.
128 Old Company Law, supra note 103, arts. 1-5, 7.
129 C. Civ. art. 1832 (67e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1968).
130 See E. CHURcH, Busnss AssoCIATIoNs UNDER FRENcH LAW 217 (1960).
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company had the right to bring a proceeding for annulment against
the company.1' 1 If the annulment was obtained, it had retroactive
effect and made the company null and void ab initio.132 The third
party who dealt with the corporation was bound by the retroactive
declaration of nullity and lost his preferred claim to company assets.
After the retroactive annulment, he was reduced to equal status with
the personal creditors of the shareholders. 1 38
The New Company Law has changed the situation considerably.
In the main, the new law reduces the grounds on which nullity will
be declared and sets up provisions by which the various defects in
incorporation can be cured without a declaration of nullity.134 Arti-
cle 369 makes it clear also that the company may not benefit from
improper incorporation vis-a-vis the third party acting in good faith.
More important, under the new law the retroactive effect of a dec-
laration of nullity, with the corresponding danger to third parties,
has been eliminated. Article 368 states that when a corporation has
been annulled, it will be liquidated in accordance with the general
provisions on liquidation, thus protecting legitimate claims of third
parties. This greater protection given to third parties by the new
French law was clearly influenced by the provisions of the draft
directive relative to the elimination of the retroactive effect of an
annulment.135
2. The National Law-Germany
In Germany, section 275 of the AG Law sets forth the grounds for
a declaration of nullity. The criteria for such a declaration are far
less expansive than those of the old French law. The declaration can
be obtained when the charter deposited on formation lacks any of the
required information or has some error in form. And unlike the
French law, both old and new, the German law does not allow the
formation of a corporation to be attacked on the basis of general
contract principles.13
6
131 Charpentier v. Miiller, [1965] JouiL Soc. 250 (Cass. ch. civ.).
132 Soci~t6 de Trport-Terasse v. Moreau liquidateur de la Soci~t6 La
Nouvelle-Union, [1887] D.P.I. 417 (Cass. ch. civ.). The principle of the retro-
active effect of nullity laid down in this case was followed in modern cases.
See E. CHUncu, supra note 130, at 230.
133 See, e.g., Lecoq v. Bavire [1894] JouR. Soc. 68 (Cass. ch. req.). For
a discussion of the old law, see J. HAmE & G. LAGARDE, 1 TRAs DE: Dsorr
CoMMzRcrAL 561 (1954).
'34 New Company Law, supra note 1G2, arts. 360-67. Rules governing
nullity of contract still apply, however.
135 Projet de Loi No. 1003, [1963] J.O. 693, 697 (Documents Parlemen-
taires-Assembige Nationale).
136 AG LAw § 275 (1).
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As well as limiting the grounds for a declaration of nullity, the
German law protects third parties from the effects of such a declara-
tion. Section 277(2) of the AG Law specifically provides that the
validity of legal transactions (Rechtsgeschifte) undertaken in the
name of the corporation will not be affected by a declaration of nullity.
Thus, the third party can assert his claims against the company
since a declaration of nullity will in no circumstances have a retro-
active effect.
3. The Directive Provisions on Failure to Incorporate Properly and
Its Effects
The approach of the final Directive to annulment problems has
changed somewhat from that of the draft directive. In the first draft
directive the only grounds for a declaration of nullity were an illegal
purpose of the corporation or some defect in the procedure under
which the corporation was formed. 13 7 The final Directive spells out
the possible grounds for nullity in considerably more detail and ex-
pands their scope to a certain extent.138
The Directive follows the basic principle of the prior draft direc-
tive by providing that in the event of a declaration of nullity, the
company shall be liquidated and the declaration of nullity shall not
"impair the validity of obligations incurred by or towards the com-
pany .... -139 Clearly, this provision will prevent those difficulties
of retroactive annulment which arose under the old French corpora-
tion law, and remains consistent in principle with the provisions of the
new French law, which was seen to have been based, in part, on the
prior draft directives. 140 In addition, any shareholders who have not
paid in all the subscribed capital can be required to make such pay-
ments to the extent necessary to satisfy the obligations of the company
to third parties.141
The Directive would require no significant changes in the ex-
isting French and German law apart from a possible reduction in the
grounds for a declaration of nullity under French law based on con-
tract principles. One of the Directive sections on nullity, how-
ever, presents a problem common to all attempts to coordinate exist-
ing company law, which has not yet been considered. Article 11(1)
137 [1964] BuLL. E.E.C. art. 13 (Supp. No. 3).
138 Article 11 (2) provides that companies may be annulled where pro-
cedures for formation have not been properly followed, when the documents
fail to show the name of the company, the capital or the purpose, where all
of the founders lacked capacity or when the number of shareholders is reduced
to one, if national law prohibits one-man companies.
139 First Company Law Directive, supra note 7, art. 12(3).
140 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
141 First Company Law Directive art. 12 (5).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
COMPANY LAW IN THE EEC
states that the declaration of nullity must be made by judicial decree;
thus only through the action of a judicial body may the company be
annulled. This procedure raises the broader question of judicial
participation in the coordination of company law.
After the existing national laws and regulations have been al-
tered in response to the Directive, there still remains for the national
courts the problem of interpretation and application of the new legal
provisions. A fully satisfactory coordination of company law provi-
sions cannot take place by means of directives alone. Only when the
courts of the Member States begin to consider decisions rendered
by the other national courts on similar problems will the required
harmonization in company law provisions be obtained. That this
judicial interaction in company law will take place is by no means
certain. However, by increasing the similarity of some of the basic
company law provisions, the directive procedure of Article 54(3) (g)
at least makes it more likely that the courts in one country will look
to the decisions of courts in another Member State regarding the com-
pany law problems which arise, and this in itself will further the
process of harmonization.
M. Article 54(3)(g) and Proposals for a "European" Company
In addition to the work on company law undertaken by the Com-
mission and the Council in connection with Article 54(3) (g), much
consideration has been given in the past few years to the creation of a
special company form which would be available for businesses in the
Community. The idea of a special form of European company is a
marked departure from the provisions of the Treaty of Rome dealing
with company law, and presents a whole range of new problems. It
is beyond the scope of this article to examine in any detail the
numerous questions which the suggestions for a European company
form have raised. However, it is helpful to consider in general the
relation between the various proposals for a European company form
and the reasons which prompted them, and the procedures for the
coordination of company law under Article 54(3) (g) which have
been examined here.
The first suggestion for a European company in the context of
the European Economic Community was made in an address delivered
by Professor Sanders of Rotterdam in 1959.1.4 In March of 1965, the
idea was raised again in a Memorandum by the French government
to the Council.143 After noting the slow progress in the coordination
142 Sanders, Auf dem Wege zu einer Europdischen Aktiengesellschaft?
[1960] 6 AW, 1.
143 Text of a Memorandum submitted by the French government to the
EEC Council, March 1965, 2 CCH Comm. MxT. REP. f 9025 (1965). For a dis-
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of company law, the French Memorandum suggested that the govern-
ments of the six Member States meet outside the framework of the
Community institutions to draft a uniform law which then would be
incorporated in a multi-national convention. As part of the conven-
tion, each Member State would agree to enact the uniform company
law into its own legal system.14 4
The Commission replied to the French proposal on April 22, 1966
in a Memorandum to the Council supporting the idea of a European
company.145 This Memorandum set out in detail the arguments in
favor of the establishment of this new type of company organization.
As to which form a European company could take, the Commission
suggested that such a company might be organized under a convention,
supplementing the Treaty of Rome, which would have direct effect
in the Member States as a new "European" law existing in association
with the domestic laws.
In addition to its Memorandum to the Council, the Commission
established an ad hoc working party in December of 1965 under the
direction of Professor Sanders to explore further the possibilities for
a European company.146 The Sanders group drew up a preliminary
draft of a statute under which a European company could be organ-
ized,147 leaving open the question whether it should be enacted by the
national legislatures as a Zoi uniforme as the French proposed, or
adopted in the form of a convention having direct effect as sug-
gested by the Commission. The draft statute, as well as the Com-
mission Memorandum and the French Memorandum, were considered
further by another working party appointed by the Council and also
chaired by Professor Sanders, which reported to the Permanent Rep-
resentatives of the Council in April of 1967.148 It is expected that the
cussion of the French proposal, see Foyer, La proposition francaise de cred-
tion dune socigtg de type europien, [1965] REVUE DU MARCHM ComnuN 268.
One of the effects of the French proposal and clearly an intended one would be
to reduce the importance of the "supra-national" Community institutions in
the company law area by resort to the more traditional methods of conventions
and uniform domestic legislation.
144 2 CCH Comnm. MKT. REP. f[ 9025 (1965).
145 Memorandum by the Commission of the EEC on the Establishment of
European Companies, April 22, 1966, [1966] BULL. E.E.C. 5 (Supp. No. 9/10)
[hereinafter cited as Commission Memorandum].
146 See note 148 infra.
147 P. SANDERS, SocIETE ANoNYME EUROPEENE (1966) [hereinafter cited as
DRAFT EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE]. This report was printed in a limited
number of copies by the Commission. A copy is on file at the Hastings Law
Library. For a summary of the Sanders proposal, see Thompson, The Creation
of a European Company, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 183 (1968).
148 For a summary of the status of the European Company project, see
Written Question No. 327/67, E.E.C. J.O. No. C/46, at 3 (April 28, 1968), 2
CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 9234 (1968).
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Council itself will be considering the problem soon.
In its memorandum on the desirability of a European company,
the Commission outlined the present needs which such an entity
could fill. In the first place, such a company form would facilitate
the exercise by businesses of their right of establishment in other
Member States. The Commission analyzed the extension of economic
activity in three areas: (1) recognition of companies; (2) transfer of
seat; and (3) establishment of subsidiaries. According to the Com-
mission, company law difficulties in these three areas could be solved
by adopting some form of European company. Clearly there would
be no question as to the recognition of a European company since it
would have its legal basis in a convention ratified by all of the Mem-
ber States. Further, if a European company form was available, the
presently existing company law problems relating to transfer of seat
would be eliminated, since there would be no change in the company
law applicable to a European company when it moved the location of
its activities from one Member State into another.149 Finally, if a
single legal form could be used, it would simplify the setting up of
subsidiaries and would facilitate the management of the international
operations of larger companies.
In addition to these advantages, the Commission also stressed the
function which a European corporation would have in encouraging a
greater concentration of industry within the Community. This was
the premise behind the original French suggestion and has been the
leitmotiv running through all the discussions of the various propo-
sals. 50 A European company form would simplify international
mergers by providing a legal framework in which companies organ-
ized under different national legal systems could combine. The ex-
isting national laws are not adequate for this purpose.1 5 1 Such a form
would be neutral with respect to "nationality" and thus could avoid
the often vexing problem of choosing which of the existing national
laws would be applicable to the company resulting from the mer-
149 The tax law problems would of course remain. See note 28 supra.
15O See, e.g., Memorandum on Concentration of Enterprises in the Common
Market by the Commission of the European Economic Community to the Gov-
ernments of the Member States, CCH Comvi. MKT. REP., Report No. 26 (March
17, 1966); Gessler, Grundfragen der europaischen Handelsgeselischaft, 22 DER
BETmR Bs-BRATEr 381 (1967); Sanders, supra note 87, at 345; Scholten, The
European Company, 5 Comm. MKT. L. Ray. 9 (1967-68); Storm, Statutes of a
Societas Europaea, 5 Comn. MKT. L. REV. 265, 269 (1967); Towards the Euro-
pean Company, TuE EcoNoM sT, June 15, 1968, at 60.
151 See G. ScHLossEm, supra note 24, at 153; Conard, Corporate Fusion in
the Common Market, 14 Am. J. ComP. L. 573 (1966). Article 220 (3) provides
for a negotiation by the Member States on a convention dealing with the prob-
lems of mergers between companies organized in different Member States,
but little progress has been made.
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ger.152 The European company form could also be used as a holding
company vehicle, allowing the pooling of financial interests without
an actual merger of one company into another. Finally, the European
company form would allow companies organized in different states
to form joint subsidiaries, again without the necessity of stipulating
that the subsidiary be organized under the laws of one or another of
the Member States. In all these areas, the establishment of a Euro-
pean company form would encourage a concentration of economic
resources and would enable businesses within the Community to
compete more effectively for both capital and customers with large
American enterprises.153
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the reasons behind
the proposals for a European company are closely connected with
Article 54(3) (g). Both the French and Commission Memoranda
point to the lack of progress under Article 54(3) (g) as justifica-
tion for the adoption of a European company form. This does not
mean, however, that the establishment of a European company will
eliminate the need for further action under Article 54(3) (g). The
European company concept has certain inherent limitations as the
following analysis of the question of access to the European company
form will show.
The question of the criteria to be used in determining which
businesses may organize as European companies has plagued the pro-
ponents of the European company idea from its inception. One pos-
sibility would be to make access to the European company form as
wide as possible, so that formation would be no more difficult than
is domestic incorporation. However, if all domestic companies were
free to adopt the European company form, it would be possible for
them to avoid burdensome regulations in national company laws which
were not reflected in the European company statute. 54 This difficulty
152 The difficulty in deciding which national company law will apply to
the surviving company is a practical impediment to more international merg-
ers. See Sanders, supra note 87, at 345; Storm, supra note 150, at 268.
153 The access to capital markets has become an increasingly important
problem since the American balance of payments regulations (33 Fed. Reg.
49 (1968)) have forced American companies to turn to the Euro-currency
market for financing. The Commission has stressed that the increased size
of Community businesses which would be made possible by the adoption of a
European company would help their position in the competition for Euro-
currency financing. Written Question No. 286, E.E.C. J.O. No. C/17, at 17 (Feb.
23, 1968), 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 9224 (1968).
154 The most important problem in this area concerns the question of labor
representation on the governing board of the company. This institution of
Mitbestimmung or codetermination is important in Germany and to a limited
extent in France but is not known in the other Member States. Germany will
require some provision for codetermination in the European company statute
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must be faced in any event, no matter what criteria for access are
finally agreed upon. However, the dimensions of the problem are
considerably reduced if the access to the European company form is
restricted to only a portion of the domestic companies.
One possible method of restriction would be to require that a
company show some substantial business activity inside the Commun-
ity before incorporation as a European company would be allowed.
This would be a difficult standard to administer as a practical matter,
since some kind of policing would be required to ensure that the
requisite intra-community activity was maintained.
This type of "activity" test was rejected by the Sanders working
group, whose proposal would limit access to the European company
form to organizations having certain minimum capital.155 For the
creation of a new European company through merger, or for a Euro-
pean holding company, a minimum of $1,000,000 capital would be re-
quired. A corporation presently organized under the laws of one of
the Member States which wished to reincorporate as a European
company would be required to have a capital of $500,000. The
formation of a European corporation as a wholly or jointly owned
subsidiary would require a minimum capital of $250,000. Other pro-
posals have suggested minimum capital requirements ranging from
$1,000,000 to $150,000-$200,000.156
It becomes immediately apparent from these figures that, under
any of the existing proposals, the European company form would be
available only to larger enterprises. It was estimated by Professor
Sanders that a minimum capital requirement of $250,000 would allow
only 10 percent of the existing Community companies to organize as
European companies.157 While the hoped for increase in international
mergers would raise this figure, and the use of the European com-
pany could promote joint ventures by several smaller companies on a
larger scale, nonetheless, the large majority of companies involved in
intra-Community trade would still be formed under national com-
pany laws even after the establishment of a European company form.
Thus, the basic problem at which the European company proposals
are directed is the need for an increase in the size of the economic
units in the Community. Though the Commission Memorandum
for companies operating in Germany since otherwise the requirements of the
domestic law could be avoided. Various solutions to the problem have been
suggested. See Sanders, supra note 87, at 347.
155 DuRu EufoPEAx ComPANY STATUTE, supra note 147, art. 1-3(1) to (2).
156 Gessler, supra note 150, at 387 (the prospective European company
must have at least $1,000,000 capital in its interstate activities); Scholten, supra
note 150, at 13 ($150,000-$200,000 as minimum capital).
157 Sanders, supra note 87, at 346.
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speaks of the need for a European company in order to solve certain
existing company law problems relating to establishment, a closer
analysis shows that these matters are adequately handled by already
existing legal tools. With respect to recognition of companies, the
Convention contemplated by Article 220(3) has already been con-
cluded and awaits only ratification. 158 As to the formation of sub-
sidiaries, another point mentioned in the Commission Memorandum,
the Commission itself states that presently "the establishment of sub-
sidiaries raises no insoluble problems under company law ... "159
In addition, Professor Sanders has written that the problems of trans-
fer of seat can be satisfactorily resolved by means of a treaty under
Article 220 (3) .160 The basic function of a European company form,
despite the Commission's discussion of establishment problems, would
be to encourage the formation of larger companies within the Com-
munity.
IV. Conclusion
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the European company
proposals, the continuing importance of Article 54(3)(g) becomes
clear. The European company form would enable businesses to com-
bine into larger economic units, but even if all the problems concern-
ing a European company statute can be resolved, much of the intra-
Community trade will still be carried on by small and middle-sized
firms organized under national company laws. The problems relat-
ing to freedom of establishment and legal security created by differ-
ences in the existing company laws, seen in the first sections of this
article, will still be present, and additional modifications in the na-
tional company laws will be needed. The First Company Law Direc-
tive is a significant beginning toward the solution of these problems,
but much remains to be done in the harmonization of company law.
The proposals for a European company, interesting though they may
be, should not be seen as offering a panacea for all the company law
problems in the Community, and the issuance by the Council of the
First Company Law Directive will hopefully bring renewed attention
to the role of harmonization of national company laws in the future
development of the Community.
158 See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
159 Commission Memorandum, supra note 145, at 14.
160 Sanders, supra note 87, at 344.
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